

UNDERSTANDING PEACEBUILDING

in the Context of

BURMA

Run Pen Sakhong

Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Uppsala University, 2004

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Designed by:
Sai Mawn
UNLD(LA)

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To my beloved son Van, my daughter Laura and my husband Lian

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Allowing that long suffering people to live with dignity is the core values of humanitarian and peacebuilding knowledge, which is something that I am pursuing for Burma.

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Run Pen Sakhong

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ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GONGO	Government Organized Non Governmental Organization
ICG	International Crisis Group
INGO	International Non Governmental Organization
KIO	Kachin Independence Organization
MP	Member of Parliament
NDF	National Democratic Fronts
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NUGUB	National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma
NCUB	National Council of the Union of Burma
NLD	National League for Democracy
NMSP	New Mon State Party
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
UN	United Nations
UNA	United Nationalities Alliance
UNLD	United Nationalities League for Democracy
UNLD-LA	United Nationalities League for Democracy (Liberated Areas)
USA	United States of America
USDA	Union Solidarity and Development Association
UWSP	United Wa State Party

Understanding Peacebuilding in the Context of Burma

Run Pen Sakhong

*Department of Peace and Conflict Research,
Uppsala University, 2004*

Abstract

This research focuses on the concept and practice of peacebuilding. The main objective of this study is to find a new perspective or theory that will lead to the improvement of societies marked by civil war and protracted internal conflict, like the Union of Burma. This research finding will hopefully help to analyze how to establish a stable and sustainable peace in a cultural, political and social context of Burma. A qualitative exploratory, *inductive and deductive research* method is used in this study. The term **Peacebuilding** in this study refers a broad definition to those initiatives which foster and support sustainable structure and processes that strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and at the same time avoid the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of internal violent conflict. Inductive concepts and explicit theoretical hypotheses are adopted from existing research: *Peace and Conflict 2001 and 2003*:

A Global survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-determination Movements, and Democracy and the International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. Such peacebuilding strategies suggest the proposition to address the local roots of hostility, the local capacities for change, and the specific degree of international commitment available to assist change. The interpretation of this case study is close to the "insider" perspective of presentation, which allows a better understanding of analyzing in a complex context of the Union of Burma. In this way, peacebuilding concepts, theories and practices that have been done in other countries are tested in the present context of Burma and measure it in tentative outcome for the recommendation. Recommendations are given to the international community, including NGOs and civil societies that directly concerned with Burma, for their consideration in policymaking and effective implementation towards peacebuilding for the people of Burma.



CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

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Introduction

The role of humanitarian assistance, particularly the trend of *links between relief and development* has been perceived as tools in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.¹ A great deal of human tragedy is linked to civil war, political instability, protracted internal conflict due to unjust policies and practices in a community or a society or a country and its regional consequences. In such a situation, emergency relief and crisis intervention are important not only to save the life of those who are directly affected but to resolve the root cause of humanitarian problems.

While pursuing their aim of saving lives, humanitarian relief agencies need to be aware of the long-term effects of their work on people and communities, which include the aspect of recovery and reconstruction for normal functioning. Recovery and reconstruction entails capacity building in order to avoid the creation of dependency or the strengthening of flawed structures in the society. Thus, humanitarian agencies need to balance the need of distributing emergency relief and the solution of the root cause of the conflict, whether they are related with social, economic and/or political inequalities, which triggered the con-

flict in the first place. Therefore, in conflicted or post-conflict societies, there is increased awareness of the need for post-conflict reconciliation, development of capacity for conflict resolution, and the building of sustainable peace.

There are different angles in peacebuilding definitions. Some scholars, for example, suggest that "peacebuilding is the effort to promote human securities in societies marked by conflict."² This indicates the overarching goal of peacebuilding is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict without violence, as a means to achieve sustainable human security. To pursue that goal, the term peacebuilding³ involves a variety of activities in the fields of security, economic development, institution-building and democratization, and dialogue and reconciliation, all in an effort to strengthen social capacities for avoiding conflict escalation and finding peaceful ways of managing and resolving contentious issue. A more general post-conflict definition can be read as follows:

Peacebuilding refers to abroad definition to those initiatives which foster and support sustainable structure and processes that strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violent conflict. This means the attempt to overcome the structural, relational and

cultural contradictions that lie at the root of conflict in order to underpin the process of peacemaking and peacekeeping.⁴

This research particularly focuses the concept and practice of peacebuilding in societies suffering from protracted conflict. In the present context of Burma, there is no significant change that can be termed as "pre-conflict" or "post-conflict" peacebuilding. For example, because of its protracted internal conflict, the situation of Burma is categorised as in unstable stage of peace.

This is a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high, but violence is either absent or only sporadic. A 'negative peace' prevails because although armed force is not deployed, the parties perceive one another as enemies and maintain deterrent military capabilities. A balance of power may discourage aggression, but crisis and war are still possible. Government repression of groups is one domestic variety of this level of conflict.⁵

This definition describes best the situation in Burma, where the country has not experienced pre- or post-conflict peacebuilding.

In recent years, Burma has been subjected to international community attention and external pressures

because of its internal political turmoil, fifty years of civil war, systematic suppression of all democratic political oppositions, and human right violations. However, though there are some pressures from international community, there is no international peacebuilding operation; even the so called **Monitoring or Observer Mission**⁶ has no full mandate for its operations in the country. The reason is that such operations require the consent of the host government, and all the conflict partners and main stakeholders must be ready to negotiate in order to achieve a negotiated settlement.

Unfortunately, present military government in Burma is unwilling to negotiate with the NLD, the main opposition party that won 1990 election, led by the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. They also refused to engage dialogue with ethnic minority groups, those who have been fighting more than fifty years for their rights of self-determination and greater autonomy of their respective homelands. Thus, an attempt made by the UN Secretary General's special envoy⁷ and the UN Human Rights envoy,⁸ should to be viewed as an alternative perspective, a distinct form of international community engagement with societies in conflict, not as international intervention.⁹



1.1. Aims and Objectives

This study is aimed at finding a new perspective or theory that will lead to the improvement of societies marked by civil war and protracted internal conflict like Burma, and to establish a stable and sustainable peace in such countries. This study will, therefore, analyze the concept and practice of international peacebuilding. The case of Burma is chosen as a grounded applying context for determined or adapted explicit theoretical hypothesis from existing research. The findings will produce some recommendations, which are intended to assist with building an appropriate peacebuilding strategy that can be feasible and relevant in the context of Burma.

Objectives:

- (1) To identify the capacities of peacebuilding in Burma from a conflict resolution perspective.
- (2) To adopt the *International Peacebuilding theory*, and link with the situations of Burma.¹⁰
- (3) To project some tentative outcome and make recommendations that can lead to peacebuilding in Burma.



1. 2. Research Hypothesis

Why is a peacebuilding effort needed in Burma? Is this different from other forms of assistance such as humanitarian and development aid? Why peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding are different processes? Because peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention in internal conflict presume that almost all operational action will be defined and implemented by external agencies such as UN peacekeeping forces, UN specialized agencies and funds, and humanitarian NGOs. These external interventions have specific operational objectives, which often do not directly contribute to the building of stable and sustainable peace at societal level.¹¹

First, this study aimed at exploring a set concept based upon the interpretation of peacebuilding as assisting the establishment of "local capacities", or "an indigenous capacity" to resolve conflict peacefully.¹² The very notion of "local capacities" addresses the needs of local participants as peace builders, and the need of empowerment in their ability for making peace.

The distinctiveness of peacebuilding as a specific subject of inquiry and action lies in its emphasis on addressing the root causes of conflict within society. In Burma, the root cause of conflict never received

proper attention, especially ethnic conflict and fifty years of civil war. Instead of conducting thorough investigation, open debate and deep research on the root cause of conflict, the government makes political debate a subject of *taboo*. Such political constraint and restriction eventually become another source of conflict in Burma. Therefore, secondly, this study will examine how *the political openness* - which requires a minimum standard of democratization - can help peacebuilding in Burma.

Hopefully, this study will enhance a better understanding of peacebuilding efforts and conflict resolution that can bring stable and sustainable peace in Burma. The following hypotheses are proposed to be tested in this research:

Hypothesis 1: *Peacebuilding is assisting the establishment of local capacities to resolve conflict peacefully.* Local capacities mean co-efficient of human resources development and institution building for the people of Burma, who are with in the system of conflict.

Hypothesis 2: *Political openness (which requires a minimum standard of democratization) is an essential mean of peacebuilding in Burma.*



CHAPTER TWO

*Review of the Background
Literature*

CHAPTER TWO

Review of the Background Literature

To identify the peacebuilding capacities in Burma in a conflict resolution perspective, relevant publications include: *Peace and Conflict 2001 and 2003: A Global survey of Armed Conflict, Self-determination Movements, and Democracy*, published by Center for International Development and Conflict Management in 2000 and 2003. These two-research presentations in each book provide Country Rankings of Conflict and Peace-Building Capacity in 2001 and 2003, respectively.

The method and analysis used are the same in both, although the table of *Peace and Conflict Ledger* in 2003 has two additional indicators than in the 2001. It is very general data but competing trends of 158 countries are evaluated and placed into three ordered categories of peacebuilding capacity and its related factor; as in red, yellow, and green icons of flag. Red-flagged countries are considered to be greatest immediate risk of new outbreaks of violent societal conflicts and government instability; green-flagged countries enjoy the strongest prospects for peace. The case of Burma is particularly examined and picked up from those seven indicators from 2001 and nine from the 2003 to present in this paper.

2.1. The Case of Burma

Burma is characterized as a weakened and war-torn society by red-flags in the *Peace and Conflict ledger*.¹³ Indicators which explain a country's capacity for peace building to be high insofar as it has avoided recent armed conflicts are included in a global survey of Peace and Conflict, 2001 and 2003, respectively. The indicators of Burma selected from that table are presented in table 2.1.1. The interpretation of the indicators follows after this table.

2.1.1. The Peace and Conflict Ledger for Burma

Indicator	2001 Icons flag	2003 Icons flag
<i>Peace-Building Capacity</i>	Yellow	Red
<i>Armed Conflict</i>	Red	Yellow
<i>Human Security</i>	Not mentioned	Red
<i>Self-determination</i>	Yellow	Yellow
<i>Discrimination</i>	Not mentioned	Red
<i>Regime Type</i>	Yellow	Yellow
<i>Regime Durability</i>	Green	Green
<i>Societal Capacity</i>	Red	Red
<i>Neighborhood</i>	Yellow	Yellow

Peacebuilding Capacity¹⁴ : The indicators of peacebuilding capacity in 2001 and 2003 classified Burma with yellow and red icons respectively. As Gurr, Marshall and Deepa point out, those color-icons indicate the evidence of problems in Burma with serious risk of armed conflict and political instability for the foreseeable future.

Armed Conflict: A red in 2001 highlights Burma with a medium to high magnitude of armed political or ethnic conflict. A yellow in 2003 identifies either a sporadic intensity armed conflict in the late 2002 or an armed conflict that was suspended or repressed between late 1999 and mid 2002.

Human Security: 2001's *Ledger* did not include a Human Security indicator. However, the Peace and Conflict Ledger 2003 indicates the general quality of human security in the county over the past ten-year period (1991-2000). The Human Security indicator incorporates information on armed conflicts and rebellions, inter-communal fighting, refugee and internally displaced populations, state repression, terrorism, and in a few cases, genocide. Burma's red icon indicates that it has had a generally high level of human security problems in several of these categories over a substantial period of time.

Self-determination: This category takes into account the success or failure of governments in setting self-determination conflicts from 1980 through 2002. Burma's yellow icons reflects the pattern of violent, self-determination movements in 2002 and a track record of accommodating other such movements in the past 20 years.

Discrimination: The red icons for Burma denote active government policies or social practices of political or economic discrimination against minorities comprising at least ten percent of the population in 2001. Discrimination against minority identity groups is strongly associated with divided societies. It is also indicative of strategies of exclusion by dominant groups.

Regime Types: The yellow icons represent full autocratic regimes, the nature of Burma's political institutions in 2000-2002.

Regime Durability: This icon indicates the maturity of a country's system of government and its conflict management capabilities. New political systems have not yet consolidated central authority during their first five years. A green icon is used for countries, including Burma, whose polities were established before 1992.

Society Capacity: This indicator combines information on both GDP per capita (income) and societal energy consumption per capita (capitalization) over the past ten-year period. Burma's red icon signifies the lowest quintile (the bottom 20%) of societal capacity.

Neighborhood: This icon indicates the extent of armed conflicts in 1999/2000 and the prevailing type of regime - democratic, anocratic, or autocratic - in politically relevant neighborhoods in each region (South Asia, East Asia, etc.), defining good and bad neighborhoods for countries. Yellow icons indicate that Burma lies in a region with middling levels of armed conflict and mostly autocratic regimes.

2.2. International Peacebuilding: A theoretical and Quantitative Analysis

The second set of literature review concerns *International Peacebuilding: A theoretical and Quantitative Analysis* by Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis of the *American Political Science Association* (2000). This is a literature guide and the main reference to concepts, theories and practices related to international peacebuilding. The authors test peacebuilding strategies with the propositions to address the local roots of hostility; the local capacities for change; and the (net) specific de-

gree of international commitment available to assist change.

An extensive data set of 124 post World War Two civil wars are tested with those ten propositions. They suggest that international peacebuilding can improve prospects for a civil war to be resolved. They insist that although peacebuilding strategies must be designed to address particular conflicts, broad parameters that fit most conflict can be identified. Their findings also indicate that multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference. UN peacekeeping is positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war, and multilateral enforcement operations are usually successful in ending violence.

It admits that one of the most important challenges the international community faces is the question of how to rebuild stable polities in the aftermath of civil war. However, they have a clear and broad description of peacebuilding, saying:

In current usage in the UN and among the private voluntary organizations, peacebuilding is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution. Strengthening state institutions, increasing political participation, engaging in land re-

formed, deepening civil society, finding ways to respect ethnic identities: all are seen as ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance.¹⁵


2.2.1. The Peacebuilding Triangle

The Peacebuilding Triangle—from *International Peacebuilding: A theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, which explores quantitatively analysis on the correlates of all decision-making with respect to peacebuilding after civil war --is useful in Burma's case. The argument is interesting, suggesting that the probability for peacebuilding to succeed is based on a function of a country's material and institutional capacities, the available international assistance, and the depth of war related hostility. A Peacebuilding Triangle or the three strategy dimensions of a triangle, which suggests addressing more specifically in net outcome, is as follows:

- the decision to support peacebuilding (PB) is enhanced by both local and international capacities for peace;
- the net local capacities (NLC) are given by the difference local capacities (LC) or developmental potential minus war - generated hostility (H);
- the international capacities (IC) can substitutes for deficiencies in local capacities for the depth of hostility.

Thus, the theory of the PB process is captured by expression: $PB=IC*NLC$.

Figure 1: The Peace building Triangle



2.2.2. Ten Policy-relevant Hypotheses

I am intending to adapt the "ten policy-relevant hypotheses" from Doyle and Sambanis' *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis* (2000). The data¹⁶ and explanatory variables¹⁷ were linked as proxies to make empirical findings and to interpret peacebuilding outcomes two years after the end of civil wars. The empirical findings and interpretation include the above three-core set of variables- hostility (H), local capacities (LC), and international capacities (IC). There are two variations of the model in measuring the test result. Firstly, the *Cold War* relevant evidence of *ending violence* focused on what is called "Lenient Peacebuilding model". The variable denoting *democratization* focused on what is called the "Strict Peacebuilding model". The peacebuilding success was mainly discussed in the short-term (two year). A short summary of hypotheses are stated as below:

1. The probability of peacebuilding (PB) success should be lower in identity wars (i.e. ethnic and religious wars).
2. The probability of PB success should be lower the greater the human costs of war (deaths and displacement).
3. The probability of PB success to be higher the longer the war.

4. The probability of PB success should be lower the larger the number of factions.
5. The probability of PB success decreases with increases in ethnic heterogeneity.
6. The probability of PB success should be higher the higher the per capital income and the higher the country's overall economic development level.
7. The probability of peacebuilding failure - that the risk of new war - should be high in highly resource-dependent countries.
8. The probability of peacebuilding success should be higher if the war ends in a peace treaty.
9. The probability of PB success should be higher if UN peace operations are employed.
10. The probability of PB success should be higher the stronger the UN peace operation and the more extensive its mandate.¹⁸

The main concern is also how international capacities-UN peace operations in particular-influence the probability of peacebuilding success. Therefore, all UN operations are classified into four types:

- (i) Monitoring of Observer Mission;
- (ii) Traditional Peacekeeping;
- (iii) Multidimensional Peacekeeping; and
- (iv) Peace Enforcement.¹⁹

They provide understanding on different effects and result of each mission.

The data, *Index Models of Peacebuilding Success, Comparative Statistics and Policy Analysis* have identified the critical determinants of peacebuilding processes that conclude the finding. As Doyle and Sambanis explain, "higher-order peacebuilding is more likely after non-identity war, after long and not very costly wars, in countries with relative high development levels and where the UN peace operations and substantial financial assistance are available. Lower-order peacebuilding-an end to violence-is more dependent on muscular third-party intervention and on low hostility levels rather than on the breadth of local capacities."²⁰

2.3. Preventing Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding

The third set of reviewed literature comes from the European Center for Conflict Prevention and the Swedish Peace Team Forum, which published *Preventing Violent Conflict and Building Peace* in 2002, edited by Bengt Jonsson. This volume is a collection of presentations, discussions and recommendations from the conference, entitled: "Preventing Violent Conflict & Peace Building on Interaction between State Actors and Voluntary organizations." It address new perspectives of peacebuilding and its paradigm.²¹

The conference focused on four main items of discussion in workshops such as: *Lessons Learned from Peacebuilding, The European Union and Policies for Preventing Violent Conflict, National Infrastructures for Sustainable Peace, and Developing Civilian Peace Services*. The workshop's discussion, experiences and insights have highlighted some factors that explore new ways to meet today's extraordinary challenging dark shadows of violence and threats to principle of democracy and human rights. The participants expressed the fragility of international co-operation and endeavors as a system of state relations, the living conditions of a country and poverty that creates a background for more violence and serious difficulties in building peaceful conditions. Out of each working team (workshop) from the conference, recommendations were delivered to the member states of the European Union. One such recommendation is to take efforts of building national infrastructure for conflict prevention and peace building into more serious consideration than in the past.

The UN Sanctions Regimes: The Case of Angola is a specific case discussed in an interesting way by Anders M?llander in his book, *Creative Forces in a Multidimensional World*. The UN Security Council directed activity against the Angola rebel UNITA's war efforts under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi, who had resumed

war after the election in 1992. The Security Council reacted with unanimous decisions on sanctions in order to bring UNITA back to the democratic, political process. In 1999 the Council supported a recommendation "to trace violations in arms trafficking, oil supplies and the diamond trade, as well as the movement of UNITA funds". The fact was that the government managed to oust the rebel force from their strong holds during the latter half of 1999. Mollander emphasizes that;

'Smart sanctions' are possible and beginning to make an impact. The sanctions decisions or their implementation has thus not affected humanitarian aid to victims of the war.....To try to end the war in Angola and to alleviate the longstanding suffering of Angolan population has long been an imperative for the UN and for most of its member states. 'Smart sanctions' is becoming a recognized and applied discipline.²²

Each Report from the Working Groups reflects useful principles of practical guidance for field implementation on the subject matters.



2.3.1. Lesson Learned from Peacebuilding²³

The "Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency" (SIDA) aims to explore lessons learned from its own experiences, to gain insight and knowledge about how two commonly used evaluations methodologies work in peacebuilding. The first approach uses criteria of the "Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development" (OECD), outlining efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and relevance.

The second methodology used is from the "Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance" (ALNAP) and outlines eight different issues that guide the research, namely: *Appropriateness; Coherence; Connectedness; Gender Equality; Flexibility; Location of Responsibility; Pressure for Success/Possibility of Failure; and Institutional Competence.*²⁴ The report recognized that peacebuilding initiatives are processes that are not easy to grasp, because there is no formula for conflict resolution and peacebuilding waiting to be applied, while development work mostly has visible concrete results. It is important to be aware of the fact that there is a cultural clash between the general field of development cooperation and the field of peace and conflict.

2.3.2. The European Union and Policies for Preventing Violent Conflict ²⁵

This part will try to see why the European Union, one of the most powerful actors internationally in terms of trade, foreign affairs and development assistance, has thus far failed to maximize its potential for conflict prevention and resolution, despite its policy commitments. The strengths and weakness of EU approaches to conflict prevention and peace building have been discussed by the participants who suggest ways in which current policy positions can be more effectively mainstreamed. Sixteen points of recommendations for EU presidencies were produced from the three sessions of: *1. Developing EU policy frameworks for conflict prevention; 2. Informing policy with practice-case study experiences ; and 3. Priorities for future engagement.* ²⁶

2.3.3. National Infrastructures for Sustainable Peace ²⁷

An interesting rationale is that the EU, the United Nations and the G8 voiced their belief in the need to do more to reduce the potential for violence and to support mechanisms that will ensure peace.²⁸ According to them, the main question was: How could conflict prevention and peace building measures be incor-

porated into the structures, the strategy, and the operating policies for implementation of international governmental organizations and volunteer or non-governmental organizations?²⁹

Peace conference participants emphasized, the need to be actively involved in conflict regions by intervening in many different ways, integrating conflict prevention and peace building measures in all relevant sectors: foreign policy, trade, development co-operation, and humanitarian aid. The needs to incorporate the existing governmental apparatus, academic institutions, colleges and NGOs in implementation or institutionalization of conflict prevention and peace building at all levels-both in the governmental apparatus and in voluntary organizations/NGOs-was stressed, and a special role of women in peace building in such infrastructure was recommended.

2.3.4. Developing Civilian Peace Services ³⁰

Through experiences from conflict areas in different parts of the world, it has been acknowledged that those voluntary organizations, including churches that cooperate across national borders, can make indispensable contributions to peacebuilding processes. Articles prepared for the conference helped to provide key issues for the discussion on the education, training, prepa-

ration and commitment needed for people working in conflict areas. They also recommend national, European and international infrastructures/ mechanisms, or organizations promoting the development of a civilian peace service.

There is growing awareness about the need to interact with all stakeholders because of the complexity of building and preserving peace globally. In addition to the strong role of the state in conflict resolution, the creativity of other actors gives added value. The governments of the European Union, the European Commission and the UN now realize that voluntary organizations in civil society, their personal commitment, and contribution of individuals are increasingly important in the processes of preventing conflict and building peace.

2.4. Monitoring Democratic Transition

Luc Reychler's article "Monitoring Democratic Transition" in *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide* is highly relevant as a guide in the analysis of research assessing the democratic progress and the challenges of transition process.³¹ According to Reychler, "Democracy is a prime peacebuilder and an effective confidence - building measure"³². The resolution of ethnic conflict, the socioeconomic environment, the political-cultural

context and objective and subjective security are factors influencing the transition process and the outcome of democratization efforts.

Democracy as Actual practice: What does Democracy Really Bring? A report from a conference and workshop arranged by the Collegium for Development Studies at Uppsala University, March 12-13, 2003 proves profitable for this study. Lars Rudebeck's article on "Democracy as Actual Practice" distinguishes between two definitions or conceptualizations. The first one is *minimalist*, because it is an operational definition *limiting* democracy to its most essential institutional-constitutional, and procedural-manifestations. The second view of democracy can be grasped and conceptualized only in the *context of its own realization in actual practice*. This research examines "the minimum standard of democratization," i.e. the first definition, which I shall apply as a focus in the context of Burma.

Another article, "Successes and Failures in Democracy Support," by Helena Bjuremalm from the same report is interesting to read, particularly regarding the "the Lessons Learned." Bjuremalm argues in her article that support to democratic governance is potentially more effective if it takes into account and promotes cross-cutting political processes, and values participation, equality in dignity and rights, accountabil-

ity and transparency, rather than institution *per se*. She concluded by underlining the constructive role democracies can play in promoting development and the importance of free, open public debates as cornerstones of democracies.



CHAPTER THREE

Design and Methodology

CHAPTER THREE

Design and Methodology

3.1. Research Method

A qualitative exploratory, *inductive and deductive research* method is used in this study. First, *inductive* reasoning is applied, in which theories and practices, information and data related to peacebuilding are collected and analyzed to obtain or discover general principles of peacebuilding. The reviews of the background literature aim to obtain much of the principles as well as to provide theoretical understanding of the subject.

Then concepts, explicit theoretical hypotheses are determined or adapted from existing research such as: *Peace and Conflict 2001 and 2003: A Global survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-determination Movements, and Democracy and the International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*. These hypotheses are then applied *deductively* on the empirical case of Burma. The interpretation of the case of Burma is close to the data: the "insider" perspective is used in presentation and analysis of the context of Burma. Thus, peacebuilding concepts, theories and practices that have previously only been done in other countries are tested on Burma's present context and measured in a tentative outcome for the recommendation.

Some relevant materials, such as, *Peace and Conflict 2001 and 2003*, and *World Public Sector Report: Globalization and the State 2001*, were obtained directly from the authors and the publicizing institutions to obtain a hard copy. Both qualitative and quantitative sets of data are reviewed in international peacebuilding theories and practices. Though qualitative data predominate, quantitative data have also qualified for contextual analysis on Burma.

3.2. Theoretical Framework

The termination of a civil war and the resolve a protracted conflict--political constraint and restriction--in Burma makes many relevant contemporary peace-making³³ and conflict resolution theories relevant. The tricky thing is to find the departure points. This paper is determined to establish a theory of peacebuilding in Burma, which will help to find a means and way to solve fifty years of conflict, and to find the common ground for conflict partners in the country "...to live peacefully with the incompatibility". This is what we call "resorting to democratic forms of politics."³⁴

However, I should admit from the very outset that I will not be able to discuss in this study all those factors from conflict resolution theory and democratic transition process. This study will explore a certain areas

of international peacebuilding experiences, with concrete measurable theories and instruments, and apply them into the case of Burma. Thus, it is hoped that this study will enhance a better understanding to make the effort of peacebuilding, with an interest in "conflict resolution that expect the parties to face jointly their incompatibility and find a way to live with or dissolve it...., and parties who have been involved in deadly struggles have found ways to live one another".³⁵

If this is not feasible solution to the parties concerned in conflict, there is an alternative means, which can be accomplishment, as Boutros-Ghali suggests, with "peacebuilding aims at the structural changes that abolish violent and oppressive power relation, political oppression and social injustice and assures equal access to basic goods."³⁶ These assumptions support exploratory findings to reach a theory, which explains how one can reach a stable and sustainable peace in the context of Burma.

3.3. Research Design

This paper is divided into five parts. The research aims, objectives, and hypothesis have been put together in Part (1). The four sets of literatures that are mentioned in Part (2) of this paper guide theoretical and contextual analysis of peacebuilding capacity in

Burma. Some recommendations are made, hoping that they should fit in to the present situation of the country. Part (3) presents the process that has been carried out in this research. The method, theoretical framework, research output and value are included in this part.

Two explicit theoretical hypotheses of the research have been interacted with the "Ten Policy-Relevant Hypotheses" from the *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, which is discussed in Part (4), with the focus on the central analysis for understanding and theorizing from the context of Burma. These standards help to visualize the analysis to construct a correlation between the Peacebuilding success with international capacities (IC), hostility (H), and the local capacities (LC). The politics of Burma or the democratic transition in Burma are the essential elements that co-related in the search for a peacebuilding theory.

The findings after inquiry and assumptions, with their emphasis on addressing the root causes of conflict within society, have led to a conclusion and recommendation in the last part (5) of this paper.



3.4. Data and Sources

Peace and Conflict 2001 and 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-determination Movements, and Democracy and the International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis are viewed as primary sources of information. Other books, reports, working papers, policy papers and news from Burma related organizations that relate to peacebuilding are some examples of secondary sources. Research material has been limited to published or unpublished documents from 1995 to the present time.

Those documents come from UN agencies and INGOs, which are written by international scholars as well as local (Burmese) scholars and are available in Uppsala University's libraries or are documents held by institutions or found in private collections. To update the case of Burma, the online daily news on Burma (January-October 2003) is followed diligently. Computer-based research through Internet gateways such as key sites for social science research was done extensively.



3.4.1. Tools and Techniques

Critical reading, reasoning and analyzing of data from available resources *inductively* is the first technique that was applied in this research. Justifiable selected Peacebuilding theories and practices are adopted from those processes. The following pages will further examination of peacebuilding concepts and founding theories with *deductive* methods which will lead to the testing of the established hypothesis and theories through critical assessment on the case of Burma.

A qualitative exploratory method of reviewing and analyzing documents, which are as mentioned above; from collected books, academic and institutional journals, working papers and online news (Burma Net 2002-2003), are the main methodological tool and techniques in this research. Considerable attentions have been given also to policy, examining material relevant to peacebuilding policy papers, seminars and conference decisions reports. Because it will be very difficult to conduct a research study in isolated from what has already been done, collecting and using secondary data - be it in the form of statistics or documents - is the only choice. Therefore, it is legitimate and interesting to base my research project entirely upon such secondary data.

3.4.2. Anticipated Limitations and Difficulties

Applying the concept of peacebuilding in the context of Burma is challenging. The very complexity of the case can make analysis difficult (it is difficult to know where the "context" begins and ends). Burma has not reached conflict resolution that could conventionally launch peacebuilding stage; therefore Burma's own experiences of peacebuilding as well as theory and related literature that are feasible and relevant for this paper have been hard to find in the documents. Thus, this research uses theories and practice based upon the existing materials about international peacebuilding.

The result may be limited as to concrete implementing field experience of peacebuilding in the present Burma. However, projecting the situation in possibilities, the paper aims at achieving some tentative outcomes and recommendations that may reflect on peacebuilding in Burma at the end.

3.4.3. Research Output and Value

The idea behind this research is to contribute with a positive output and general value as a literature resource for peace and conflict research, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, in the humanitarian field. The concrete value of achievements can also be described as follows:

- (1) to provide objective, factual information on peacebuilding possibilities in Burma that can be handed over to policy maker for their use.
- (2) to understand theoretical concepts and gain deeper knowledge on specific the Burma context, which might be use as a practical tool of implementation and/or lead to broader action research projects for peacebuilding in Burma.
- (3) to provide a data source from which further analysis can be made. Therefore, this can be archived for further research work.



CHAPTER FOUR

*The Local Capacities for
Peacebuilding in Burma and
its Politics*

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The Local Capacities for Peacebuilding in Burma and its Politics

The qualitative exploratory searching to test the argument of hypothesis (1) is that "peacebuilding is assisting the establishment of the Local Capacities to resolve conflict peacefully" in Burma, which encounters a challenge on its very first step in the argument of *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, that draws the opposite conclusion. In its summary, Doyle and Sambianis argue that "Higher -order peacebuilding is more likely after non-identity war, after long and not very costly wars, in countries with relative high development levels and where the UN peace operations and substantial financial assistance are available. Lower-order peacebuilding - an end to violence - is more dependent on muscular third-party intervention and on low hostility levels rather than on the breadth of local capacities". The inter-relations between these two statements need careful assessment to the primary sources.

The term "local capacities" can encompass various dimensions and it can be defined in many ways. Assisting the establishment of the "local capacities" is

the concept that normally expresses "empowerment" or "capacity building", but it is an elusive concept, composed of several elements. For the purpose of this analysis, "local capacities" denotes the co-efficient of human resources development and institution building; and an effort to expand the existing capabilities of an organization or of the state (Burma in this case) qualitatively and quantitatively. Two principal dimensions can be distinguished.³⁷ One is a process involving the establishment, reinforcement or reform of an organizational/state framework for the conduct of human activities. The other is basically human resources development, which includes human capital formation, the enrichment and refinement of essential management skills and requisite technical aptitudes and support for value systems of organizations.

From conflict resolution approach, coping with protracted conflicts in Burma may suggest the need of "local capacities" for structural change. It is acknowledged that in many cases, resolution without major change is simply not possible.³⁸ The process of conflict resolution is partly aimed at getting parties to understand the likely long-term cost of not changing and finding alternative ways. It is a way for the parties to make sure that the other side is committed to the process and to the agreement.³⁹ The conflict in Burma is more than the behavior of the conflict partners; it is

structural violence and rooted deeply in the society. It is systematic repression, and the totalitarianism of the military regime that bring destruction of property, resources and environments, and the disruption of people's mental, physical, economical and cultural development.

As Burma is indicated in *Peace-Building Capacity*, there is evidence of problems in the country with serious risks of armed conflict and political instability in the foreseeable future that will need great effort and determination. To find ways of approaching this, it is needed to relate the political context as well as local capacities for peacebuilding. Hypothesis (2), "Political Openness", as an essential means of peacebuilding in Burma, cannot be separated with the examination of the adopted ten policy-relevant hypotheses.

It is clear that in peacebuilding⁴⁰ process, variety of activities and actions are inevitably involved. While peacebuilding as an effort to promote human securities in society marked by conflict requires specific actions, peacebuilding as the goal to strengthen the "local capacities" and to manage conflict without violence demands another level of activities, and peacebuilding as a means to achieve sustainable human security involves different level of activities in the fields. Therefore, when we pursue a single goal of peacebuilding,

there involved many issues, such as: security, economic development, institution building, democratization, dialogue and reconciliation. Moreover, an effort must be made to strengthen social capacities for avoiding conflict escalation and finding peaceful ways of managing and resolving contentious issues. In peacebuilding process, it is impossible to single out one issue from another but taken them all into consideration, in order to achieve a lasting peace.

4.1. Identity Wars

From those ten policy-relevant hypotheses, hypotheses (1) and (5) have mentioned "identity war and ethnic heterogeneity issues" as related to the success and failure of the probability of peacebuilding. They read:

- (1). The probability of peacebuilding success should be lower in identity wars (i.e. ethnic and religious wars). And,
- (5). The probability of PB success decreases with increases in ethnic heterogeneity.

While hypothesis (1) accepts that the *identity wars* are highly significant and negatively correlated with peacebuilding success, for both the lenient and strict peacebuilding models, hypothesis (5) rejects this by stating that ethnic heterogeneity is not significantly

correlated with peacebuilding success. This contradiction leads to the question whether this could be due to a selection effect, especially if the ethnic diversity is a significant determinant of the initiation of civil wars.

To relate this to Burma, it is an historical fact that the civil war in Burma began with ethnic insurgency. The social and political conflict and intra state conflicts in Burma began soon after the Union of Burma achieved independence from Britain in 1948, in which the ethnic groups Karen and Arakan took up arms to resist authority of the central regime.⁴¹ In 1962, Shan and Kachin separatist movements gained momentum across the Northeast. The same year in March 1962, General Ne Win took over the state power in the military coup and brought to an end the brief era of parliamentary democracy. Since then, the country has been ruled by military dictators under various names: Revolutionary Council (1962-1974), Burma Socialist Program Party (1974-1988), State Law and Order Restoration Council (1988-1996), and State Peace and Development Council (1996-present). As a result, dissidents from virtually every ethnic and political group have taken up arms against the central government at some stage since independence. In short, insurgency has remained endemic and in many areas of Burma, the armed struggle became away of life.⁴²

There is another major problem in Burma today, which is the "regime attempts to erase the existence of the ethnic nationalities,"⁴³ while preserving and promoting the "Myanmar identity". Such policy can be described as "cultural genocide" and "ethnic cleansing", which is officially carried out by the successive military governments of Burma since 1962. In order to response the regime policy, most of the non-Burman/Myanmar ethnic nationalities have been fighting for the autonomous status of their respective "ethnic homeland" as well as for the survival of their respective "ethnic identity". The cultural genocide and ethnic cleansing that the military junta has practiced in Burma have three dimensions: political, religious and ethnic.⁴⁴ Thus, we can say that the root causes of Burma's civil war are not only political, cultural, economic but ethnic conflict in a form of "fighting for identity".

In the past, the non-Burmans were referred to as the "Nationalities"⁴⁵ as in the Chamber of Nationalities or the Upper House of Parliament.⁴⁶ At the present, the ruling military regime of the central government is composed with all the military Generals, who are ethnic Burman. There is no single General or higher government position held by someone with a non-Burman ethnic nationality background. If an ethnic person wanted to be in the ruling rank or position, one com-

pulsory requirement is for that person⁴⁷ to convert to Buddhism, the state official religion. An ethnic citizen can never be accepted as a member of the ruling regime, especially with the new State Peace and Development Council.

Burma's Population is 52 million (as 2003 est.) living on 676,577 sq.kms. Burman is the majority race⁴⁸ in the country with around 27 million people (figures and statistics vary from one source to another). Moreover other indigenous ethnic /races likes Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kareni/Kayah, Mon, Shan categories are usually understated⁴⁹ in many presentation, so detailed statistics are hardly known. In terms of geography, the non- Burmans occupy the land area or 371,000 sq. kms. with at least 25 million people. In political terms, Burma has 8 constituent states, such as Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kayah, Karen, Mon and Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma in the centre.

The population's desires for change in government, to democracy have been expressed since 1988. The year 1988 is called the year of turmoil in the country's history, because, as Steinberg put it, "the State went to war with the Nation."⁵⁰ The confrontation between the military and the students-led demonstrators began to escalate, prompting hundreds of thousands of people nation-wide to march to demand the establish-

ment of democracy and to abolish Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the single ruling party for the country in thirty years. The regime army responded to the demonstrators with shootings and mass arrests that killed and jailed thousands. The demand for democratisation in Burma has been voiced across ethnicity and nationalities. Thousands of the people of Burma have sacrificed their lives to pushing for a political opening towards a democratic transition, which the military regime has resisted, at all costs, by suppressing the implementation of the popular mandate.⁵¹

The National League for Democracy (NLD), the party that won election in 1990, has still not been allowed to convene the parliament. In 1997, the NLD announced that it would convene the parliament and appointed a committee to exercise the mandate of the 1990 election result, and eventually formed the Committee representing the People's Parliament created in 1998.⁵² To response the NLD called for convening the parliament, the regime issued another suppressive law, by which more than 1000 NLD supporters, including 200 NLD MP-elect were detained, and 43 NLD offices were closed.⁵³ Today (by November 2003) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of the NLD, and three members of the Central Executive Committee

as well as other leaders of NLD are currently under house arrest and some are in jail, and all the NLD offices are ordered to close again.⁵⁴

The combination of political turmoil and armed struggle suggests that the search for forms of governance in multi-ethnic society is an important issue that needs to be addressed for resolution to become possible. The transformation from conflict to a peaceful nation building requires a political process, and recognition of many actors and many institutions. Multiplicity of ethnic groups or *ethnic heterogeneity* in Burma does not by itself lead to violence and conflict. It does require fundamental change in perceptions of national security and sovereignty of multi-ethnic society. Burman military regime attempts to erase the existence of the ethnic nationalities, now trapped in institutions, and attitudes have to move toward recognition of a multicultural, multi-ethnic, pluralistic national system. The revival of ethnicity and the search for identity, as Rupesnghe argues, "is itself an aspect of modernity and leads to the democratisation of structures."

If structural changes are achieved within the society and new institutions emerge to address themselves meaningfully to the issue that is affecting people's lives, strengthening "local capacities" is an essential means to possible solutions of peacebuilding approaches from

the kinds of conflict discussed above. For the people of Burma, to assist establishment of a legitimate and participative political system is a fundamental peacebuilding issue. Constructive social dialogue and co-operation, which will promote a culture of peace and reconciliation, can only be achieved with a minimal standard of democratisation. For peacebuilding to succeed, the basic types of governance that Burma will need can be classified as follows:

1. Political democracy with a free press, multi-party system, civil and political rights for its citizen.
2. Federal form of government that recognises ethnic groups and nationalities and implies devolution of governance.

4.2. The Human Costs of War

(2): The probability of PB success should be lowers the greater the human costs of the war (deaths and displacement)

Human misery created by the war is consistently and negatively associated with peacebuilding success. This finding in the policy test holds with the situation of Burma. *Unending State of Conflict and Emergency Dimension* indicates negative impact of "local capacities". The peacebuilding perspective in the given situation is analyzed under the *International Humanitarian Response*,

which represents the "international capacities" for linking aid and peacebuilding.

Though they are not typical peacebuilding activities, peacebuilding training and conflict resolution workshops can be conducted inside the country, and it is important to link humanitarian aid and peace initiatives with each other. In this way, they simultaneously address the material conditions of violence (lack of opportunities) and empower people and strengthen the "local capacities" to resolve their conflicts peacefully.⁵⁵

4.2.1. State of Conflict and Emergency Dimensions

The unending state of conflict, in which around 50,000 troops of ethnic resistance armies are matching with 500,000 strong government troops in conventional civil warfare. The cost of people's lives in the past fifty years is incalculable.⁵⁶ Hundreds of thousands of lives, both those of government army and the ethnic resistance troops, as well as those of civilians were lost in the battles of these years, unreported to the world outside. Especially the rural ethnic communities suffer from being forced by the armed groups to help as "porters," carrying military equipment and food supplies in the movement of military fields.

There are also policies of forced labour and forced relocation throughout the country that made people live in the widespread dangerous locations. In the name of national unity and stability, the military power has been enlarged in all levels of the society. In a country with no external military engagement, between 40-60% of the national budget is being spent on military affairs.⁵⁷

The latest findings of the several social indicators as follow reflect the seriousness of the situation in the country.⁵⁸

- 1) The rate of infant mortality 79/1000 in 2003, compared to 71/1000 in 1997.⁵⁹ (Officially listed still is 46/1000). Widespread child malnutrition is a significant factor.⁶⁰
- 2) Maternal mortality 486/100000.⁶¹ Rural communities' women have fewer chances.
- 3) Malnutrition, under 5years (35%). Among who are suffering malnutrition, more than 40% need intensive feeding.⁶² Food security is in a serious, alarming stage.
- 4) In 1997, the malaria rate was 22%, and an estimated 30,000 people die annually from malaria alone.⁶³

- 5) The UN estimates that 530,000 people (1.2 % of the population) are infected with HIV.⁶⁴ While the other sources suggest 687,000 Burmese, nearly 3.5% of adults are HIV positive.⁶⁵ 40% of the infected are said to be women and 5 % are children.
- 6) Only 30% of children get proper primary schooling.⁶⁶ Rural regions have a higher percentage.
- 7) The state today spends less than US\$ 0.60 per capita annually on education.⁶⁷ Real public spending on education for 5-9 year olds decreased from K1200 in 1990/91 to K. 1000 in 1999/00.⁶⁸
- 8) Less than US\$ 0.20 per capital is spent annually on health.⁶⁹ Burma's healthcare sector has been given negative appraisal from WHO since 1990.
- 9) Food security: the consumption of many families is less than usual, less than needed, and under increasing pressure.⁷⁰
- 10) More than 600,000 to 1 million are internally displaced in war zone.⁷¹ Forced relocation in Rangoon, Mandalay and other urban areas by late 1990s estimated between one to two million displaced people.⁷²
- 11) More than 450,000 refugees in neighboring countries.⁷³ Around 110,000 are in Thailand. More than 50,000 have fled to India, among whom only 800

were recognized as refugees by UNHCR. In Bangladesh, there are 21,500 in camps, more than 200,000 outside, and in Malaysia UNHCR has recognized, but there are 60,000 more seeking recognition.

- 12) Burma has the world's highest number of child soldiers (70,000) in both the regime's military and the underground armed forces.⁷⁴
- 13) Some 40,000 Burmese (mostly ethnic) women forced or sold into Thailand's brothels. There are credible stories of Burmese military raping ethnic women, using rape as a weapon against the civilian populations in the ethnic regions of the country.⁷⁵
- 14) More than 1,850 political prisoners are in jail. Political arrests continue, in July 2002 imprisonment with 72 more detained.⁷⁶ Approximately 250 people, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, were arrested in connection with the incident in Depayin on 30 May 2003, which involved serious human rights abuses and had deep political implications.⁷⁷

4.2.2. International Humanitarian Response

The current ruling military regime is seeking for international assistance to address humanitarian concern in Burma.⁷⁸ The reaction of international com-

munities to Burma's situation has been mixed. Given the constraints on government-to-government assistance and the absence of large multilateral and bilateral aid agencies (except those of the Japanese) in Burma, the main active humanitarian actors are the UN agencies and the INGOs.

There are approximately 30 INGOs operating in Burma today.⁷⁹ Some of these have been involved in the country's issues for five to ten years. The regime favours the UN agencies, because it generally has a larger direct stake in UN aid programmes. It also provides an important umbrella for the INGOs, which would be more vulnerable in a rather hostile environment if they were not part of a bigger aid system. Moreover, the military regime has set up a number of government-organised NGOs (known as GONGO). The flagship among these is the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), which is an overtly political organisation. There are several others GONGO organizations in the social field.⁸⁰

Emphasising the great needs of humanitarian assistance, the basic question is how it should be provided. The international aid organisations have done much over the last decade to promote human development in Burma-both inside and among exile Burmese people - for the refugees and democratic forces of dif-

ferent political organisations in neighbouring countries. However, because of Burma's internal political constraints, clear divisions are being drawn among the aid communities. Sharing information and experiences between humanitarian agencies in the capital, Rangoon, and along the border is "controversial".⁸¹ Accountability, transparency and independent monitoring in assisting the people are somewhat ironic in Burma. According to ALTSEAN report, "some agencies appear to intentionally disempower themselves by obeying spoken and unspoken rules of the regime, even if it means undermining their own mandate."⁸²

As the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's statement indicates, a long lasting political stalemate in Burma has continued,⁸³ and there has been growing recognition that the political crisis-the struggle for Democracy in the country- is paralleled by a humanitarian crisis, which requires more immediate and direct international attentions. These humanitarian crises apparently have threatened human security both nationally and internationally, especially in the neighbouring countries in Asia. The so called "international capacity" is needed to fill the gap for which a "local capacities"; the military regime may not able to control it own problems (the cause of humanitarian crisis?) and this has split over to neighbouring countries, successively threatening the regional stability, peace and security.

4.3. Duration of the War

(3): The probability of PB success to be higher the longer the war

Hypothesis (3) is accepted by the policy test. War duration is positively correlated to peacebuilding success in both lenient and strict models. However, the ongoing internal conflict in Burma since independence from the British colony has been exceptional to that result. On the other hand, the policy test suggests that "war -weariness" may influence the political reform process rather than the decision to stop fighting.⁸⁴

Political reform is the main concern in the present context of Burma. Violations of fundamental human rights and humanitarian law, and disruption to democracy have been long overdue to get the attention of the international community, particularly the United Nation, whose fundamental mandate and purpose is to maintain peace and security in the region and globally.

The Civil War began soon after Burma gained independence in 1948 and still continues.⁸⁵ It may be the longest - five decades of civil war - in modern history. During these years, much of the fighting has been characterised by opportunist strikes and guerrilla

skirmishes rather than pitched set piece battles. No reliable casualty figures from this era have been produced,⁸⁶ but untold tens of thousands have been killed, wounded or made homeless. Across Burma, towns and villages are swollen with refugees flooding in from the war-torn countryside of ethnic people.

Throughout the years, a largely pro-government media uncritically reported one government victory after another, but has given little indication of the slow rate of recovery for rural ethnic people to peace and security. Instead, the military, or *Tatmadaw* in Burmese, proudly claims itself as the hope of the country, its very life and soul.⁸⁷ War actors' leaderships from both the government-military regime and the various insurgency groups have been changed during these periods. Unofficial government contacts with insurgent leaders in peace talk in 1980-81 and 1987-98; since 1989, this led to 17 cease-fire agreements signed with various insurgent groups.⁸⁸ Thus a number of groups remain in active revolt in the Shan, Chin, Arakan, Karen and Karenni States.⁸⁹ There are also pockets in the cease-fire areas (e.g., in Mon State) where splinter groups have taken arms against the government due to dissatisfaction with the cease-fire deals that have not addressed political issues.⁹⁰

All the conflict and grievances in the country have been created by the military regime, allowing itself to stay in power indefinitely. For Burma, the longer the regime stays in power, the lower local capacities for peace become increasing because people lose enthusiasm for the future (democratic change) when they are too easily manipulated by the whole system of the powerful regime, again and again.

4.4. The Factions and Political Parties

(4): The probability of PB success should be lowers the larger the number of factions.

The policy hypothesis test (4) has theorized that "the number of factions has a strictly negative impact on peacebuilding". This is true in the Burma case. The five decades of civil war in Burma and its ethnic diversity have been complicated by potential differences between ideologies, leaders and followers, and factions and patrons in a long history. To concentrate the contemporary conflicts of Burma, the primary parties can be defined in two settings: the military regime against the democratic forces in general factions.

However, each group has its own issues and agendas defining its priority to "control over the resources in disputes" as the issues of "governmental power and

identity recognition."⁹¹ The stakeholders are divided into three camps: the SPDC (ruling military regime), NLD (winner of 1990 election) and the ethnic groups' leaders (1990 elected MP plus armed groups). To explain their significant functions, parties inside the country and exile groups are presented as follow:

4.4.1. Parties inside the Country

(1) Military Junta: State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)

SPDC has been the name of the military regime since November 1997. The Secretary-1 General Khin Nyunt became Prime Minister of State in August 2003, while the old (PM) Senior General Than Shwe stayed on as head of the SPDC. Khin Nyunt was close to the late General Ne Win and was instrumental in suppressing the pro-democracy uprising in 1988. He held the position of Secretary One in the ruling SPDC for 15 years. He is also the man credited with cease-fire agreements with Wa drug lords and several other ethnic groups.⁹² On September 1, his first public and policy speech gave clarifications of concerning the policies and programmes of the State at the *Pyithu Hluttaw*⁹³. His speech, "building a modern, developed and democratic nation with the state leaders elected by the

Hluttaw; and the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw", became known as the Road Map of SPDC or Khin Nyut's Road Map for democratic transition in Burma.

(2) National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi

In August 1988, U Tin U and Aung San Suu Kyi formed the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Rangoon. She gave her first public address to a crowd of as many as half a million people at Shwe Dagon Pagoda, Rangoon, saying that "this national crisis could in fact be called the second struggle for national independence."⁹⁴ A new revolutionary era was born, as the first sustained opposition movement in central Burma since Ne Win⁹⁵ closed down democracy in the early 1960s. NLD won a landslide victory with 80, 8% of votes (392 seats) on May 27, 1990.⁹⁶

The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), as the military regime was named then, reneged on its promise to transfer power to the elected body. Rather, 280 of 480 members of parliament elect have been in jailed, disqualified, forced to resign under threat, and have gone into exile or died.⁹⁷ Though mounting international pressure on her release and rec-

ognition of her party NLD aboard, Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrested for several times. The past fifteen years of her life in Burma, she has been spent under restriction of the military authority. The NLD set up a new shadow government, the "Committee of Representing People's Parliament" (CRPP), in 1998 to challenge the authority of the military regime.

(3) Ethnic Coalition: United Nationalities Alliance⁹⁸

Ethnic leaders, 1990-elected Member of Parliament who remained inside the country formed United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) in June 2002. As one leader expresses it: it is a platform "to meet and discuss matters, such as the needs of the nationalities, how to solve the political problems, to save the literature and culture of the nationalities, and the right to map our own destiny, represent the national races if the dialogue process becomes tripartite (SPDC, NLD and Ethnic Nationalities)."⁹⁹

Some ethnic political parties' leaders, particularly the leader of Shan Nationalities League for Democracy¹⁰⁰ (SNLD), who operates from the capital city of Rangoon, are given a bit of freedom of activity. Compared to his restriction before, Khun Htun Oo, Chairman of SNLD, is now outspoken about ethnic issues,

attending meetings with foreign dignitaries and giving interviews to the international press, including opposition radio stations-and these are remarkable performance for the cause. The UNA has called on the UN Secretary General's envoy, Ismail Razali to mediate legalisation of the ethnic minority parties (UNLD) banned by the SLORC in 1992.¹⁰¹

(4) The Cease-fire Groups¹⁰²

The government identifies seventeen cease-fire groups but there are major differences in their status that reflects their strength and the timing of their cease-fires.¹⁰³ While detail of the agreements have never been made public, the early cease-fire groups, including UWSA, were given extensive local autonomy, together with material support and business opportunities for developing their areas, in return for ending hostilities and pledging to avoid any cooperation with the remaining armed groups. The KIO and NMSP have similar arrangements, although their agreements were more military in nature and did not explicitly include business deals. Each organization is holding onto its arms, supposedly until a new constitution has been agreed.¹⁰⁴



4.4.2. Exile Groups of Burma Democracy Movement

(5) National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB)

NCGUB was established in the Thai border area as a "government-in-exile" in December 1990. Dr. Sein Win elected MP and cousin of Aung San Suu Kyi, heads the government which operates in Washington, DC. They also have Burma UN Service Office in New York. For the past few years, NCGUB has taken the democracy movement's case to the international community effectively. The NCGUB calls for political intervention from the international community, especially asking that the UN Secretary General to take a lead in formulating a roadmap in consultation with key international actors, taking into account visions and opinions of all stakeholders in Burma and the democracy and exile movements abroad.¹⁰⁵

(6) National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB)

NCUB is an alliance organization formed in September 1992. It has been consistently working for peaceful democratic transition in Burma from the Thai-

Burma border and in exile. Recently, the NCUB has call upon the international community and the United Nations to coordinate all their efforts. They requested that the United Nation's Security Council take an active part in the "Burma Peace Process," and implement an effective mechanism to convince the people's parliament and hand over power according to the will of the peoples as expressed in the 1990 election results. NCGUB and NUCB have many common positions on their political agenda for democratic transition in Burma.

***(7) United Nationalities League for Democracy -
Liberated Areas (UNLD-LA)***

The United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD) was established in 1988 as an umbrella political organization for the non-Burman nationalities in Burma. The UNLD adopted a policy aimed at the establishment of a genuine federal union, based on democratic rights for all citizens, political equality for all nationalities and the rights of self-determination for all member states of the Union. It declared that democracy without federalism could not solve the political crisis in Burma, including the civil war, which had already been fought for five decades.

In the 1990 general election, UNLD won 35% of the popular vote and 16% of parliamentary seats (67 seats) in the national parliament of the Union of Burma. The election results established the UNLD as the second largest political party in Burma. The military government targeted the UNLD as a most dangerous opponent, second only to NLD. Therefore the UNLD was banned and declared illegal in 1992. However, in 1998, a number of exiled politicians, including six elected members of parliament, formed the UNLD Liberated Areas (UNLD-LA) on the Thai border.¹⁰⁶ In terms of political agenda, it has much in common with the inside party, UNA.

***(8) National Democratic Front (NDF) and
Non Cease-fire the ethnic armed force***¹⁰⁷

In the NDF, all ethnic armed forces formed an alliance in 1975. It was to the KNU and NDF "liberated zones" that most of the democracy activists fled from the cities in 1988.¹⁰⁸ Since most armed resistance to the *Tatmadaw* is still being coordinated from NDF territory, most Western observers view the war in Burma from the perspective of the KNU-NDF bases along the Thai border. The NDF becomes the only ethnic minority front to have a really significant impact on the course of the civil war in Burma.

The National Democratic Front is working closely with other ethnic political organizations: the UNLD-LA and ethnic armed groups, such as Karenni National Progressive Party, and the Shan State Army, that build a joint working committee called the "Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee" (ENSCC) in August 2001.¹⁰⁹ This ethnic nationalities working committee, ENSCC in liberated areas, is yet another effort by armed ethnic nationality organizations (operating in the Thai border - non cease fire groups and some cease fire representatives) and UNLD-LA in corporation to prepare for an eventual tripartite dialogue to bring about democratic transition in Burma.¹¹⁰

4.5. Economic Failure and the Risk of a New War

(6): The probability of PB success should be higher the higher the per capital income and the higher the country's overall economic development level.

(7): The probability of peacebuilding failure- that the risk of new war-should be high in highly resource-dependent countries.

The economic resources-related probability of peacebuilding success and failure has been examined together in combining the two hypotheses: (6) and (7).

The policy tests (6) have two results. The first is that the overall level of economic development is positively correlated with peacebuilding success in both the lenient and strict models. Thus, the second result rejects the hypothesis for the lenient model: "positive local capacities seem consistently irrelevant for lenient Peacebuilding. i.e. for ending the violence."¹¹¹

Hypothesis test (7) accepts that a condition of natural resource-dependence expressed by the share of primary exports of GDP (EXP) is significantly negatively associated with peacebuilding success for both the lenient and strict models. Natural resources dependence has been identified as one of the main culprits in loot-seeking civil wars.¹¹²

Although Burma has immense natural resources, such as teak, oil and gas, precious stones, gold, and fertile agricultural lands, the country became one of the poorest countries in the world under of the military regime's centrally planned mismanagement. In 1987, the United Nations declared Burma a Least Developed Country (LDC). An example to explain this status is the one-sided economy structure in the country where the share of the industrial sector in GDP was 9.4% in 1998/99,¹¹³ while the health sector spent 0.17% of GDP. The regime "preparing for war" expanded the size of the army to half a million, and allo-

cated most of the budgetary resources to military purpose. The military reached 42 % of total state budget by 1993, and it has remained at that level ever since.¹¹⁴

Senior army officers have been given high positions in the state as the primary vehicle for accumulation of wealth, status, and power. Inequality is clearly visible in the city, where the cronies of the military live in villas and drive Mercedes, while the rest are forcibly relocated to shantytowns with poor infrastructure and an over-crowded public system. The ruling generals think they can crush any social dissent and political opposition with brute force.¹¹⁵

This year's (2003) banking crisis in Burma has brought a dark economic outlook and dragged the country into further poverty. It was reported that the price of transportation, communications, housing, and basic commodities had risen dramatically. The rise in prices has sparked a crimes increase in cities. This signal from the current situation shows that people are on the brink of starvation.¹¹⁶

The regime, its agencies, individual members, and related associations have significant control over and ownership of economic enterprises throughout Burma. These agencies and their members are also implicated in committing human rights abuses, and are accused of disregarding the rule of law and corruption. The

economic disintegration that has led to a humanitarian crisis in the country is the responsibility of the regime. Human right abuses, such as forced labor, force relocation, torture, killing, rape, looting property, and burning down homes, are also reasons for high numbers of people leaving Burma as refugees and migrants to neighboring countries. The internal conflict as a threat to the peace is visible, not only in economic problems and political repression under the ruling military regime. It also constitutes a threat to international peace and security particularly for neighboring countries, by causing mass flows of refugees and migrant workers.

4.6. A Peace Treaty and Peacebuilding Success

(8): The probability of peacebuilding success should be higher if the war ends in a peace treaty.

The policy test accept hypothesis (8) that treaties are indicators of post-war levels of hostility, since at the moment of signing, they typically represent the parties' will to end the violent phase of their conflict. Further, treaties enable international involvement, in the form of lending, foreign aid programs, transfers of goods and services, and the deployment of UN peace operation.

The military regime in Burma never opened this opportunity of official peace treaty negotiation to its opponents groups. Neither the non-violent NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi nor the ethnic armed groups in exiles are officially invited for "peace talks" to reach its agreement to have this "*peace treaty*" to begin to solve the misery of national upheaval and to end the decades long of civil wars.¹¹⁷

Hopes were raised during 2000-2002 that new ways might be found to address these long-standing conditions of crisis, when a tentative dialogue began between Aung San Suu Kyi, who was still under house arrest, and the military-SPDC leaders. The ethnic nationalities parties (both armed groups and elected MP) demanded to be included in this dialogue process.¹¹⁸ It never came to any official agreement, even about this "dialogue process".

In October 2003, the United Nations Secretary General's special envoy, Ambassador Razali Ismail of Malaysia, made his ninth trips to Rangoon. These trips have been supported by the visit of Malaysian ex. Prime Minister Mahathir to Rangoon in January 2001. Mahathir and some ASEAN leaders¹¹⁹ are said to have encouraged the military to compromise with the opposition in some manner. On 17 -18 June 2003, the 36th ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting in Cambodia in is-

sued a statement on Burma, in which the Chairman stated that he "looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD members and urged the military regime to negotiate with the democracy forces for a political transition." The importance of strengthening democracy in Burma as a fundamental element of regional security was emphasized in the meeting.

The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has urgently called for substantive talks for national reconciliation in Burma to begin.¹²⁰ It is very important that the international community should increase their supports for the democracy movement in Burma and the Burmese people by concrete actions, such as passing resolutions strongly condemning the Burmese military junta, applying the discipline of "Smart Sanctions" from the Security Council, and international peace intervention with well co-ordinated efforts. There are still some opportunities, if the UN and international communities are seriously considered the Burma's case at the UN Security Council, which can bring about political change and a democratic transition in Burma.



4.7. UN Peace Operation and Peacebuilding Success

(9): *The probability of PB success should be higher if UN peace operations are employed.*

(10): *The probability of PB success should be higher the stronger the UN peace operation and the more extensive its mandate.*

There is no specific UN peace operation that can be applied in present Burma, because all the four types of peace missions (*Monitoring or Observer Mission, Traditional Peacekeeping, Multidimensional Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement*) must have consent of the host government or be mandated operations. To gain the knowledge on this regard, the following paragraphs examine how international capacities - UN peace operations in particular - influence the probability of peacebuilding success internationally from the finding of *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*.

UN presence without specifying the operation's mandate was positively and significantly correlated with the strict peacebuilding model (democratization-focused). However, it is not significant for lenient peacebuilding (violence-focused). Therefore, while hypothesis (9) is accepted in strict peacebuilding model, on the other hand, it is rejected in the lenient peacebuilding model. It seems that peace treaties do

the heavy lifting, and therefore it is acknowledged that simple UN involvement is not enough to strengthen a war-to-peace transition.

Hypothesis (10) is agreed by stating "UN peace operations classified according to their mandate are highly significant determinants of peacebuilding process, but this relationship is quite complex."¹²¹ While it is important for the UN and other multilateral actors to become involved in a peace process, the right mandate should be used, it is suggested. There is a great limitation when it comes to identifying the impact of specific operation types using the UN operation type variable.

A focus specifically on mediation efforts (good offices, envoys, fact-finding), reveals that *UN mediation* alone is an insufficient strategy. The coefficient of *UN mediation* is negative. These operations offer additional transparency but lack commitment of resources to influence the incentives of the parties to resolve a violent conflict.¹²² On the other hand, *UN enforcement*, which usually is a multilateral, military intervention, authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and designed to impose public order by force, if needed, with or without host government consent. This is positively associated with strict peacebuilding success (ending violent conflict), but it is not significant for long

term (five years version of the peacebuilding variable). Thus, the international community cannot count on enforcement alone to build higher-order peace.

By contrast, **Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations**, i.e., missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, elections, etc., are extremely significant and positively associated with strict peacebuilding of a participatory peace. It is consent-based and is designed to implement a comprehensive negotiated peace agreement. It includes a mix of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, ranging from those of the traditional peacekeeping operations to more multidimensional strategies for capacities-expansion (e.g. economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g. reform of the police, army, and judicial system, election, civil society re building).

UN intervention in the Burma crisis has been requested by the NLD leaders Aung San Suu Kyi, the "National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma" (NCGUB), the "National Council of the Union of Burma" (NCUB) and, the "Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee" (ENSCC). The ENSCC's statement points out that "we are even willing to unilaterally declare a cease-fire in our respective areas if the United Nations can ensure that SPDC will

accept the cease-fire and the international community is willing to monitor the cease-fire."¹²³ The NCGUB calls "the Security Council's recent practice that could and should determine the current situation in Burma constitutes a threat to international peace and Security."¹²⁴ Also NCUB demands that the UN "review the Burma issue carefully in the General Assembly and bring the case to the United Nations Security Council for discussion and solution in time for 2006."¹²⁵ All this reflects the people willingness to build peace in Burma.

At the same time, insufficient "local capacity" is rampant, with the failure of the SPDC-military regime to cooperate in the peace efforts, instead prolonging the process by hindering it by all means. Therefore, alternative options need to be found and available choices need to be designed for the success of peacebuilding in Burma. Particularly, relying on UN envoys and their mediation and fact-finding efforts alone is an insufficient strategy in the case of Burma.¹²⁶ This is so because there is mismatch between the event and forms of intervention.¹²⁷ Mobilization and deployment of skilled personnel must be done much earlier, to enforce and monitor a cease-fire, which the ethnic armed groups have expressed their willingness to carry out, even though the parties in conflict (the SPDC) rarely find legitimate frameworks to discuss these issues.

The United Nation is rightly placed and has within its mandate the opportunity to address Burma's internal issues. It can be a "Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operation" which missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, elections, which are extremely significant and positively associated with strict peacebuilding, a participatory peace. Together with the local capacity, this would aim to put an end to random and uncontrolled violence and provide a reasonable degree of peace so that humanitarian relief work could proceed in any of the neediest regions in the country. Recovery and reconstruction will bring together with reconciliation and the settlement process, which would be undertaken for the re-building of the Union of Burma in democratic transition.



CHAPTER FIVE

*Conclusions and
Recommendations*

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The UN General Assembly Resolution on Myanmar¹²⁸ strongly urges the government to restore democracy and respect the results of the 1990 election, and to enter immediately into substantive and structured dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and other leaders of the National League for Democracy. This process will promote democratization and national reconciliation, and should include, at an early stage, other political leaders in these talks, including representatives of the ethnic groups.

The European Parliament resolution on Burma 2003 also urges the SPDC to ensure that the contacts with Aung San Suu Kyi and other leaders of the National League for Democracy move without delay into substantive and structured dialogue, aiming at democratisation and national reconciliation and deploring the continued violations of human rights, particularly those directed against persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities and women in Burma. The denial of religious freedom is also a concern expressed in that resolution.¹²⁹

Given the situation in Burma and possible peacebuilding efforts from UN, how the UN picks their fight for peace is a substantive issue to explore. The high degrees of correlation between deployment, mandate, and strength of UN operations will determine peacebuilding outcomes. The UN's decision to intervene might have been determined by some other reasons. Has not UN found sufficient reason to intervene in Burma? If so the UN might have decided heroically only under the severest of conditions. What do all these resolutions in Assembly and Sessions of the Committee mean in real implementation when it comes to solving the problems? Do five decades of civil wars and ruling military regime eliminate elected democratic leaders, and is the internal political turmoil in Burma case too complicated to intervene? So, UN picked the easy fights. Though *UN presence* is not the main focus in this paper, it is said that "the Security Council gets motivated to act in a conflict when it is urgent to find a solution and when parties are willing to let that happen....it means that the conflicts in the Security Council are riper for resolution than many other."¹³⁰

The previous "Peace Building Triangle"¹³¹ may suggest more specifically addressing understanding of peacebuilding in the context of Burma from that theory of expression: $PB=IC*NLC$ (Peacebuilding = International Capacity X the Net Local Capacities). It is clear

that the decision to support peacebuilding (PB) is enhanced by both local and international capacities for peace. That has been explained that difference local capacities (LC) or developmental potential minus war-generated hostility (H) gives the net local capacities (NLC) in the second factor; in the previous discussion under *the Local Capacity for Peacebuilding in Burma and its Political Openness*.

The main focus that needs to be explored in this conclusion is therefore the third factor: Can "international capacities" (IC) substitute for deficiencies in local capacities caused by the depth of hostility? Some clarification about deficiencies in local capacity is needed to help confirm the two hypotheses that have been laid down in this research.

5.1. Potential versus Deficiencies in Local Capacities

Burma from the perspective of "local capacity" has the potential for peacebuilding among the parties in conflict, since they (NCGUB, NCUB and ENSCC) express their agenda and aspirations as building the country in a peaceful way. To begin with, the ethnic nationalities' leaders offered to enter into a nation-wide cease-fire and negotiate a peaceful political settlement

with the NLD and the SPDC through a "Tripartite Dialogue"¹³² based on the principles of the 1947 Panglong Agreement, that is, equality, voluntary participation and democracy.¹³³

The NUGUB and NCUB "Building a Roadmap toward Democracy and Federalism in Burma"¹³⁴ included the establishment of a "National Reconciliation Government (NGR)" with representatives from a wide range of institutions and professions by 2006. The NRG aims to meet the basic needs of the people of Burma within co-operative framework of shared responsibility among the leaders of the SPDC, ethnic nationalities and the NLD.

The new Prime Minister of the regime, General Khin Nyunt, also announced the government's political program for building the nation through four political objectives¹³⁵ and seven steps of implementing "Road Map of Myanmar" in the following way:¹³⁶

- (1) Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996.
- (2) After the successful holding of the National Convention, step by step implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system.

- (3) Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles and detailed basic principles lay down by the National Convention.
- (4) Adoption of the constitution through national referendum.
- (5) Holding of free and fair elections for *Pyithu Hluttaws* (Legislative bodies) according to the new constitution.
- (6) Convening of *Hluttaws* attended by *Hluttaw* members in accordance with the new constitution.
- (7) Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the *Hluttaw*; and the government and other central organs formed by the *Hluttaw*.

Building a new, peaceful, modern, developed and democratic nation is an aspiration shared by all the people of Burma. Prime Minister Khin Nyunt clearly outlined the regime's plan to restart the stalled National Convention, followed by the drafting of a new Constitution; conducting referendum and finally, holding a nationwide election.¹³⁷ Many observers, including UN General Secretary Kofi Annan, commented on the missing *timeframe* that should be attached in his policy. Moreover, it is quite obvious that the regime will take the lead and will set agenda to its own liking and space.

Those who agree are welcomed, but those who disagree will all be left out of the process.¹³⁸

This policy statement could be, on the other hand, taken as a declaration of war on the democratic and ethnic opposition camps and a clear rejection of the UN resolution, which calls for a "tripartite dialogue" between the NLD, SPDC and non-Burman ethnic nationalities. In the same vein, it challenges the US and EU positions of all-inclusive, power-sharing formulary through negotiation.¹³⁹ This is, in fact, a manifesto showing that the SPDC military regime is determined to cling on to power at all costs and would not budge to any pressure from any quarter. It may well be that the SPDC is proclaiming its intention to restart the National Convention only to buy time and, perhaps, to soften the Western Sanctions.¹⁴⁰

Deficiencies of "local capacity" for peacebuilding may be pointed out here. The NLD has the mandate and legitimacy to govern and draft the constitution by power of their victory in the 1990 nationwide election that the military regime has refused to honor, relinquishing power. The military regime's self-help conflict resolution to reconvene the National Convention is mainly geared towards achieving supremacy over all contenders. Considering the various stakeholders in the country, the SPDC on its own is never going to find a solu-

tion to the problems acceptable to all. For one thing, there is no plan (or at least not included in the road map) to disarm around 50,000 troops of ethnic armed people plus the 190,000 strong government military under arms. Millions of refugees in neighbouring countries and war related IDP issues are in entangled.

The military regime needs mass organisation that would propagate its views when the time came for the promulgation of the new constitution.¹⁴¹ The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA)¹⁴² based on youth were founded in September 1993 by the SLORC. The organisation of the USDA parallels the administrative structure of the state. In late 1996, it had over 5 million members, according to General Than Shwe, chairman and patron of the USDA. By 1999, it had over 11 million members.¹⁴³ Many of USDA's activities are directed against the NLD. The mass rallies, which according to General Than Shwe, a total of nearly 2 million people have "unanimously" attended, are designed to focus on both support for the military and opposition against "destructive" elements. It is also evident that there is considerable ideological training given to the USDA leadership, and such training also includes military subjects.

The USDA is viewed as a kind of civil guard, supplementing military control mechanism. Civilians in rural

cities and towns, including women, are intensively trained for possible military capability.¹⁴⁴ There is enough evidence¹⁴⁵ to show that these USDA members are responsible for the latest incident of massacre¹⁴⁶ in Depayin, on 30 May 2003, and the "secret dialogue process" between SPDC and NLD was halted. It was the regime's severe hostility - harsh in attitude and treatment - towards the NLD and its leaders upon "*Depayin, 30 May 2003 incident*" that provoked the international community pressures on the government.¹⁴⁷

The tough new U S sanctions including a trade ban,¹⁴⁸ the European Union has targeting more Myanmar officials for visa bans, a set freezes, and suspended trade privileges are directed at Myanmar's alleged use of forced labour. The regime has replied that "the U S government's tough economic sanctions on developing countries, including Myanmar, will fuel hatred and international conflict, and harm international friendship, stability and Cooperation" through the New Lights of Myanmar newspaper.¹⁴⁹

How can international capacities substitutes for these deficiencies of "local capacity" for peacebuilding? How could conflict prevention and peacebuilding measures be incorporated into the structures, the strategy, and the operating policies? The answer to the research hypothesis 1 in concrete term would be:

1. To establish Local Capacities in order to resolve the conflict peacefully, a co-efficient of human resources development and democratic institution building for the people of Burma, who live within the system of conflict, needs to be complemented by special tasks performed by international capacities.
2. In the depth of hostility, the deficiencies of local capacities in Burma could be substituted by international capacities for peacebuilding, whose task would be in the form of *Multidimensional Peace-keeping nature; encompassing military, political, humanitarian and human rights elements*. This should be regarded as one of the first steps in laying the foundation for sustainable peace in a Burma emerging from conflict.

It appears that the research hypothesis "Peacebuilding is assisting the establishment of the 'local capacities' to resolve conflict peacefully in Burma" is not sufficiently forceful to overrule the theory of *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*. It states: "Higher -order peacebuilding is more likely after non-identity war, after long and not very costly wars, in countries with relative high development levels and where the UN peace operations and substantial financial assistance are available. Lower-

order peacebuilding-an end to violence-is more dependent on muscular third-party intervention and on low hostility levels rather than on the breadth of local capacities."

Democracy is a prime peace builder and an effective confidence-building measure.¹⁵⁰ Support to constructive social dialogue and co-operation, which will promote a culture of peace and reconciliation, can only be achieved in Burma with a minimum standard of democratisation. Assuming that the political openness (the hypotheses: 2) will follow from the peacekeeping, which has to lay the foundation for sustainable peace in Burma.

The importance of free, open public debates as cornerstones of democracies has to be the central policy for all the parties, citizens, and the people of Burma. Only this political openness will bring about a substantial peace and democracy in the country, which would build capacity in the people of Burma (and not just the elite's military regime) to make meaningful use of the rights and institutions involve. This would be one way of achieve general justice and equality within all aspects of life and all parts of the society in Burma.



5.2. Recommendation

The recommendations are guided by the emphasis of Peace Conference¹⁵¹ participants on *National Infrastructures for Sustainable Peace*.¹⁵² In which the northern countries' representatives stress the need to be actively involved in conflict regions by intervening in many different ways, by integrating conflict prevention and peace building measures in all relevant sectors: foreign policy, trade, development co-operation, and humanitarian aids.¹⁵³ They stress the important of incorporating the existing governmental apparatus, academic institutions and NGOs in implementation or institutionalization of conflict prevention and peacebuilding at all levels. The special role of women in peacebuilding within such an infrastructure was also stressed during the conference. This provides an opportunity to search for international capacities from various sectors, which (if there is a will) can substitute for the deficiencies in Burmese capacity for peacebuilding.

As the research result has indicated, the tasks of international capacities can only be undertaken, if the entire international community-the UN and its member states, regional organizations and their member states, and international non-governmental organizations- is mobilized. Therefore the following four areas of recommendations are given to the international com-

munity, together with domestic organizations and civil societies of countries directly concerned with Burma, for their consideration of Policy making and effective implementation toward peacebuilding for the people of Burma.

Foreign Policy:

- To make the ruling regime - SPDC - carry out a genuine political and economic reform, the regional countries - China, India, Japan and ASEAN countries - should review their policy of the so called "engagement policy". Without democratic practices and economic reforms, the long-term effectiveness of well-intentioned aid and any assistance will be trivial and possibly damage the struggle for democracy and national reconciliation.
- The SPDC needs a clear message of sanctions; as sanctions of the EU that settled on tightening the implementation of already existing sanctions in Burma had a strong political message but only a little direct impacts¹⁵⁴. Loosely applied sanctions could empower the regime to defy the international bodies and render such policies as ineffective discipline.
- It is time to create a strong *Third-Party Assistance with Power Mediation Team* from the UN, in col-

laboration with all concerned parties, such as USA, EU and ASEAN countries (additional to the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar and the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights). These mediators should take the initiative in the process, rather than leaving it with conflicting parties (SPDC, NLD, and non-Burman ethnic nationalities representatives). The team would share all the aims of the pure mediators, but the means would be different: it would have leverage over all the conflicting parties and it would use incentives and punishments to persuade the parties to yield inflexible positions and embrace compromise.¹⁵⁵ With the help of such a *Power Mediation team*, the conflict in Burma might stand a chance to be resolved.¹⁵⁶

- The *Targeted Sanctions from the UN Security Council*¹⁵⁷ can be an effective tool against the powerful military regime and its economic gain.

Trade:

- In Burma, control over power and access to riches go hand in hand for the military regime. They have managed to dominate many of the key economic sectors and extended their reach into virtually all aspects of the formal economy of the country. For

a regime whose power is based on the repression of human rights and political aspirations of the people, economic growth and prosperity is seen as alternative sources of legitimacy.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, economic trade sanctions and campaigns against foreign investment in Burma have effectively prevented this strategy for political legitimacy.

- The SPDC's oldest and most important ally in trade is China. It supplies most arms and weapon, and it conducts a lot of trade with Burma from which the regime can profit directly. The strong nations (EU; USA; Japan, and others) need to find the necessary political will to engage China in co-operation towards Burma's political transition. This would increase international political pressure; the participation of China could be the quickest path for Burma in its democracy transition.

(1) *Development Co-operation:*

- In accordance with the UNDP's Human Development Report 2002,¹⁵⁹ International Development Co-operation must be aware that *sustained poverty reduction, successful development - in today's developing countries (particularly for Burma) - requires that poor (ordinary) people have political power.* The best way to achieve that in a manner

consistent with human development objectives is by building strong and deep forms of democratic government at all levels of society.¹⁶⁰ For an effective process of peacebuilding in Burma, political dialogue between all political stakeholders needs to be emphasized. Assisting the restoration of democracy in respect of the results of the 1990 elections is the first step that international donor can begin with. Where the political and cultural context is underlying structural causes of conflict, with decades of mistrust and violence, aid intervention in Burma has to find a way to address the issue in strength of "capacities for peace and connectors"¹⁶¹ from the local community.

- Help to create an enabling environment so that the people can experience what the *Democratic governance* is, and connected to the field of peace and development from a human development perspective, so that the people of Burma will be free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender, or any other attribute.

(2) *Humanitarian Assistance:*

- A most needed international humanitarian assistance action has to be prepared with "characteristics of the conflict areas" in mind.¹⁶² The condi-

tions restricting the work of agencies, particularly those imposed by the regime, have been key obstacles to effective aid work in Burma.¹⁶³ And the regime it-self has been the single largest contributory factor to Burma's humanitarian problems.

- It is important to secure the safe and unhindered access to all parts of Burma from the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations so as to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance and to guarantee that it reaches the most vulnerable groups of the population.
- Urgent actions in response to the present context must be addressed in peacebuilding approach. The following areas are suggested (Note: some solutions may already exist in the country):
 - 1) An immediate end to the recruitment and use of child soldiers, child labor, and forced labor for military purposes.
 - 2) To call a nation-wide cease-fire, to make sure that cease-fire agreements are followed by a meaningful and substantive political dialogue, aim at to achieve a negotiated settlement; and to ensure that ex-armed groups are disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into society.

- 3) To end systematic enforced displacement and provide protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. It is needed to establish assistance to allow safe and dignified voluntaries return of refugees, of exile groups to reconcile them with the community.
- 4) To carry out the actions appropriate to fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
- 5) To promote individual and collective security in armed-conflict-affected areas, especially to protect sexual violence and rape against the ethnic women by soldiers of regime's army, something that has taken place within military bases in all their respective regions (Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kaya, Mon, and Shan).
- 6) To support constructive social dialogue and cooperation for the purpose of promoting a culture of peace and reconciliation, in full awareness of the need to protect the identity of ethnic nationalities by building civil society capacity for conflict resolution and reconciliation, and to promote popular participation in the political process by advocating democracy principles and basic human rights.

- 7) Finally, the principle of humanitarian aid "neutrality" should not be mixed up with political naivety or fearfulness. Naivety renders humanitarian agencies wide open to manipulation by the regime. In order to be able to address the issue of humanitarian aid effectively, while at the same time bringing relief to the neediest people, the root cause of the conflict and suffering, i.e. its political context, has to be integrated into the very principle of humanitarian aid program in Burma.



APPENDIX A: INGOs Operating in Burma/Myanmar

Name of organization	Year established	Main sectors of activities
Medecin Du Monde	1991	health, HIV/AIDS
World Vision	1991	Health, HIV/AIDS, macro-credit, street children
Medecins Sans Frontiers-Holland	1992	Health, HIV/AIDS
International Federation of Red Cross	1993	Health
Adventist Development and Relief Agency	1995	Health, sanitation
Bridge Asia Japan	1995	Income generation
Care	1995	Health, HIV/AIDS, agro-forestry
Gret	1995	Micro-credit, food security
Population Council	1995	Reproductive health
Population Service International	1995	HIV/AIDS, Social marketing
Pact	1995	Micro-credit
Save the Children-UK	1995	Social development, child development
Save the Children-US	1995	Health, education, income generation
World Concern	1995	Health, education, income generation
Oisca International	1997	Rural development, agro-forestry
Association of Medical Doctors Asia	1997	Health

Grameen Trust Bank	1998	Micro-credit
International Committee of the Red Cross	1998	Prison conditions, health
Marie Stopes International	1999	Reproductive health
Association for	1999	Disability rehabilitation
Karamosia International	1999	Integrated development, environment
Medecins Sans Frontieres-Suisse	1999	Malaria
Partners	1999	Water and sanitation
Medecins Sans Frontieres-France	2000	Malaria
U-Law	2000	Drug rehabilitation
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue	2000	Humanitarian Activities
Aide Medicale Internationale	2001	Health
Swiss Aid	2001	Environment, agricultural development

Sources: Adapted from UN/Myanmar, Country Paper, and January 2002

APPENDIX B: Chart of armed ethnic group *(Source: M. Smith)*

April 2002

Non cease-fire groups	Founded Year
1) Arakan People's Liberation party to Arakan Liberation party	(1949-50) (1975)
2) Arakan Rohingya National Organisation	(1988)
3) Chin National Vanguard Party Chin National Front	(1959-63), (1989)
4) Hongsawatoi Restoration Party	(1969)
5) Karen National Union note: 1995-96 Peace talks broke down	(1956-58)
6) Karenni National Progressive Party note: 1995 cease-fire broke down	(1967-75)
7) Lahu National Democratic Front	(1960-63)
8) Mergui-Tavoy United Front	(1970-74)
9) National Socialist Council of Nagaland	(1965-69)
10) National United Party of Arakan	(1975)
11) Shan State Army note: reformed 1996 after Mong Tai Army surrender	(1964-95)
12) Wa National Organisation note: 1997 talks broke down	(joint 1983)

Main cease-fire groups (in order of agreements)	Year
1) Kachin Independence organisation	1994
2) Karenni Nationalities People's Liberation Front	1994
3) Kayan New Land Party	1994
4) Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organisation	1994
5) New Mon State Party	1995
6) Kayan National Guard	1992
7) Palaung State Liberation Party	1991
8) Pa-O National Organisation	1991
9) Kachin Defence Army	1989
10) United Wa State Party	1989
11) Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army	1989
12) Democratic Karen Buddhist Army	1995

NOTES

1. Scholdan, Bettina (2000), "Addressing the root causes: Relief and development assistance between peacebuilding and preventing refugee flows", in *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, July 2000, p.5.
2. A definition of Peacebuilding from <http://www.canadem.ca/peacebuilding.htm>.
3. The term Peacebuilding established in the international vocabulary in 1992 when the concept was set out by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then UN Secretary-General. PRIO Annual Report 2002. www.prio.no
4. Reychler and Paffenholz. (eds.) (2001), p. 62. See also Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouses (2000), pp. 56-57
5. Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict*, p 39.
6. Doyle, Michael W. & Nicolas Sambianis (2000), p. 5.
7. Ambassador Razali Ismail of Malaysia has been appointed in 2000. Since then he has made at least 11 missions to Rangoon.
8. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, a Brazilian Professor has been in the country for his sixth mission to Burma, on November 6, 2003. His mission was to end a deadlock between the military government and the opposition National League for Democracy and investigating alleged rights abuses.
9. Cockell, John G, "Peacebuilding and Human Security: Frameworks for International Responses to Internal Conflict" in *Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges*, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Report No. 48. P 203.
10. Cf. Doyle, Michael W. & Nicolas Sambianis (2000), *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*.
11. John Cockell, *Peacebuilding and Human Security* (1998), p. 209
12. *The International Peace Academy*, 1996, cited also by John G. Covkell (1998), p. 206.
13. Gurr, Ted Robert, Monty G. Marshall and Khosla Deepa (2001), p. 2 and (2003), p. 4.
14. The summary indicators of seven component listed on the right side of the ledger. Weighted values are assigned to each of the seven indicators (2 for red, 1 for yellow, -1.5 for green).
15. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000), p. 2
16. The data set include 124 cases of International War and Peacebuilding Outcomes since 1944. The analysis in the paper includes only wars that terminated before 1997 and war that were ongoing as of December 1999.
17. The conflict conditions has (a) caused more than one thousand deaths and in at least a single year; (b) it has challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; (c) it occurred within the recognized boundary of that state; (d) it involved the state as a principal

- combatant; (e) it included rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state; and (f) the parties were concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war.
18. Cf. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000), pp. 12-14.
 19. Ibid., p. 11
 20. Ibid., p. 29
 21. Around 100 selected participants from EU member states, both government and non government organizations leaders including the representative of United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs attend for the conference "Promoting Prevention of Violent Conflict and Build Peace by Interaction between State Actors and Voluntary Organizations." at Gripsholm, Mariefre, Sweden. May 1-4, 2001.
 22. Anders Mollander in Bengt Jonsson (2002), p. 38
 23. During the conference, the Working group 1 was organized by European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation representatives.
 24. The project of Sida focused on five different case studies: 1. The Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information. 2. The Olof Palme International Center in the West Balkans. 3. The Conciliation Resources project on Women's empowerment and the Star Radio Project in Liberia. 4. Diakonia in South Africa. 5. The East Timor dialogues project of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University.
 25. During the conference working group 2 was organized by Saferworld and International Alert.
 26. See detail statements in Bengt Jonsson (2002), pp. 86 - 88
 27. European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation representatives organized the Working group 3, during the conference.
 28. Bengt Jonsson (2002), p. 89
 29. Ibid.
 30. Working group 4 organized by Peace Team Forum
 31. Luc Rechler and Thania Pffenholz (eds.) *Peace Building : A Field Guide* (2001), p. 216
 32. Reychler and Pffenholz (2001), p. 216
 33. William Zartman, John Paul Lederach, and Adrian Guelke are few examples.
 34. Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution* (2002). P. 54
 35. Wallesteen (2002), p. 53
 36. Boutros-Ghali (1992), para. 5
 37. UN-World Public Sector Report: Globalization and the State, 2001. p 100
 38. Christopher Mitchell, p. 24
 39. Wallensteen (2002), p. 36

40. A definition of Peacebuilding from <http://www.canadem.ca/peacebuilding.htm>.
41. Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (1991), p.7
42. Martin Smith, *Burma* (1991). p. 28
43. Ethnic languages are prohibited to teach in school. Burman Military man who could marry ethnic girls is given privilege in rank. Civil government employees are ask to receive Buddhist ceremony before they enter into their post, failure to do will follow with punishment.
44. National Council of the Union of Burma.Report. October 2003, p. 20
45. Since the word the "ethnic minorities" became used more frequently in international circle, the term "ethnic nationalities" or the non-Burma ethnic nationalities is used to denote the non-Burman in this writing. In deed, no less than 67 separate indigenous racial groups have been identified in Burma, not including the various Indians, Chinese and Europeans who make the country their home.
46. Between 1948-62, Parliamentary Democracy period in Burma
47. Particularly most of Chin, Kachin and Karen people belong to Christian.
48. "Race" is used as common usage in Burma, which refers to different ethnic nationalities in the country.
49. David Steinberg, *Burma. The State of Myanmar* (2001), p.87
50. Ibid. p. 127
51. Zaw Oo and Kai Grieg (1999), p. 93
52. David Steinberg, *Burma* (2001), p. 232
53. Ibid. p. 234
54. Burma Net: Daily Internet News from June to November 2003.
55. Reychler & Paffenholz (2001), p. 242
56. Martin Smith (1991), p.10, cited also by Bertil Lintner, *Land of Jade: A Journey through Insurgent Burma* (1990.)
57. Ibid., p. 10
58. Source: Mostly collect from online as mention in each, unless mention, see UNDP, Human Development Report, 1999.
59. Emergency phase of crude mortality phase is 1/10000/day. Medicines sans Frontieres.1997. p.256
60. Michael von Hauffman (2001), p. 40
61. The region Asia rates is 420/100000. WHO estimated.
62. Medecins sans Frontieres (1997), p. 40.
63. UN official data; the government figure is 10 times lower (UNICEFT, Children and Women in Myanmar, April 2001)
64. The government denies that the figure are high, but has recently acknowledged that it HIV/AIDS is a major health threat
65. 1999 study by Chris Beyrer, an epidemiologist at the John Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health who works with WHO in Burma.

66. UN/Myanmar, Country Paper, January 2002
(internal working paper)
67. Ibid.
68. David Steinberg, *Burma* (2001), p. 210
69. Ibid.
70. Human Rights Watch/ Asia, "Voice of a Hungry Nation", 1999
71. www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/easia-pacific/burma.htm
72. Donald Seekins, *The Disorder in Order: The Army-State since 1962* (2002), p. 197
73. www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/easis-pacific/burma.htm
74. Ibid.
75. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro's Statement at the 58th Session of the General Assembly, November 2003.
76. web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/ASA_160062001?OpenDocument
77. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro's Statement at the 58th Session of the General Assembly, November 2003
78. National Council of the Union of Burma.
Report. October 2003. P. 36
79. See Appendix A. Sources adapted from UN/Myanmar, Country Paper, January 2002 (internal working draft) and Directory of International Non-Government Organization Working in Myanmar, February 2001.
80. Other GONGOs in the social field include MMCWA, MRC, Myanmar Medical Association, The Myanmar Nurses Association, the Myanmar Health Workers Association, and the Education Development Association.
81. Inside INGO, including UN agencies thinks correspondence with border is too vulnerable. As the same way they seldom give the real "some" information on inside the country to border aid community.
82. ALTSEAN-Burma, October 2002.
83. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's report to the 58th session of General Assembly.
84. Doyle and Sambanis (2000), p. 18
85. See Appendix B:
86. Martin Smith, *Burma* (1999), p .118
87. Radio advertisement and public poster used to post in cities and towns' walk side in Burma.
88. See Appendix B for cease-fire groups and non-cease group's name and numbers.
89. Appendix B has identified f cease-fire groups and non-cease groups with name and years.
90. The Burma Fund. P. 4
91. Wallenstein (2002), p.46
92. BurmaNet News: August 26 2003.
93. People Parliament House

94. "Speech to a Mass Rally at the Shwe Dagon Pagoda" in *Freedom from Fear*, p. 193.
95. He had ruled Burma since 1962, is always been refer as the main power holder and preceptor of the military regime.
96. Donald Seekins, (2002), p. 210
97. National Council of the Union of Burma's Paper. October 2003. P.9
98. The seven ethnic representatives: Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Mon, Shan are in the group.
99. International Crisis Group. P.14 quoted from interview of Democratic Voice of Burma with Khun Tun OO (SNLD leader).
100. SNLD won 23 seat out of the 57 contested the second highest number of any party.
101. SLORC: State Law and Order Restoration Council, the name of the military regime 1988-1996.
102. See Appendix B : cease fire groups
103. See Appendix B
104. ICG. P. 8
105. NCGUB & NCUB have a "Framework of Ideas" for Burma's Roadmap towards Democracy and Federalism in Burma. August 20. 2003 (Confidential Paper)
106. ICG (2003), p. 14
107. See Appendix B for the names and groups numbers
108. Martin Smith, *Burma* (1999), p. 280
109. Leaders from 8 major ethnic organizations
110. Lian H Sakhong, *The New Panglong Initiative* (ENSCC: Policy Papers), 2002. p.3. Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Co-operation Committee (ENSCC) main purpose is to foster unity between all ethnic nationalities and to promote a peaceful political settlement in Burma through a "Tripartite Dialogue".
111. Doyle and Sambanis (2000), p. 20
112. Ibid.
113. Michael von Hauffman, p. 16
114. Zaw Oo and Grieg, Kai (1999), p. 130
115. Ibid.
116. ALTSEAN Burma. Report Card. Jan-March 2003.
117. In 1996, KNU has held talks with SLORC in four preliminary meetings. But the negotiation became unsuccessful because what the SLORC wanted was the unconditional and unilateral surrender of arms by the KNU. Since the KNU could not accept, the SLORC unilaterally pulled out from the talks and started intensifying military offensive against the KNU.(Interview with Pado Mahn Shar , General Secretary of Karen National Union KNU, by Chinland Guardian in November 22, 2002)
118. "Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee: Policy Papers". 2002. p. 53

119. Thailand Prime Minister, Indonesia President and Philippines minister are more outspoken on Burma issue.
120. European Burma NGO Network and Burma Alert readers, June 2, 2003.
121. Doyle and Sambanis (2000), p. 21
122. Ibid. P. 22
123. *Re-Building the Union of Burma: ENSCC Policy Papers* (2002),, P. 16
124. Burma UN Service Office, NUCUB and The Burma Fund's Report Paper. P. 19
125. NCUB's paper "Time for UN Intervention in Burma/Myanmar: A Threat to International Peace and Security." P. 41
126. The visits to Myanmar by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar during the past year, and the visits by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar;
127. Human Right envoy Mr. Pinhero and General Secretary representative Mr. Mr. Rosalie like the massacre incident of Depayin on 30 May, 2003 take time to reach the UN and inquiry with independent International Corporation.
128. Year 2001, 2002 and 2003 United Nation General Assembly Resolution on Myanmar. (UN use Myanmar as an official name of the country)
129. European Parliament resolution on Burma. 2003. D
130. Wallenstein (2002), p. 246
131. See from 2.2.1 of this paper. P 11
132. As per UN General Assembly resolution on Myanmar 1994
133. European Parliament resolution on Burma. 2003. H "The ethnic nationalities' leaders, meeting jointly in Copenhagen in September 2002, again offered to enter into a nation-wide cease-fire and negotiate a peaceful political settlement with the NLD and the SPDC through a 'Tripartite Dialogue' based on the principles of the 1947 Panglong Agreement - equality, voluntary participation and democracy.
134. Building a Roadmap toward Democracy and Federalism in Burma "*Framework of Scenarios*". NCGUB & NCUB. August 2003.
135. (1) Stability of the State, community peace and tranquility, prevalence of law and order; (2) National reconsolidating; (3) Emergence of a new enduring State Constitution; (4) Building of anew modern developed nation in accord with the new State Constitution.
136. *The Sun*, published by Asian Tribune Co., Ltd. Vol.2 No. 61. 31/08/2003
137. The National Convention, which began in January 1993 after general election in 1990, has adjourned for more than seven years since March 1996.
138. Sai Wansai: General Secretary, Shan Democratic Union. *Commen-*

tary: SPDC's National Convention Rhetoric and Power Mediation. Asian Tribune 01/09/2003.

139. Ibid.
140. In July 2003, the US passed the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, which prohibits the importation into the United States of any goods from Burma. This was a huge success for the democracy movement this success only holds for the United States. The effort to end all the international trade that supports the dictatorship in Burma is an agenda for many activists' organizations in Europe and USA. They have worked on for years, which have pursued company by company boycotts and sanctions implemented by the US in 1997 on new investments in Burma to be extended to all investments. However, American companies with investments in Burma, largely oil companies, retain the right to pursue their operations. Therefore it must continue the fight to have them expelled as well. European and Asian companies continue to invest in Burma, and to import goods from the country.
141. The organization of USDA parallels the administrative structure of the state. In late 1996, it had over 5 million members, according to Than Shwe, SLORC chairman and patron of The USDA. By 1999, it had over 11 million members. They ran "Buddhist culture courses" at some 18,692 locations. They also ran other courses such as English proficiency, computer training, marine courses, and general aviation courses. At what level these courses operate is unknown, but education opportunity seems to play an important role in the youth becoming membership of USDA, since public schools were closed.
142. All statistic are from Steinberg, 2001. p 110-115
143. Ibid.
144. Since the beginning of 2003, civilians of rural people (especially in Chin State) are informed that the America armed force is coming to attack Burma, as they do in Iraq to the Saddam's regime.
145. The events of 30 May 2003, the corresponding, subsequent and continuing violations of human rights which constitute a serious setback for the human rights situation in the country, and the apparent involvement of the Government-affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Association in these events.
146. The death toll reach more than 70 persons and hundred of people badly injured, including Aung San Suu Kyi self and some NLD leaders.
147. The Southeast Asian neighbors have delivered an unprecedented rebuke over ASSK latest detention. Japan, a key donor has suspended fresh aid to Burma. European Union has targeted more Myanmar officials for visa bans and a set freezes.
148. The new U S sanctions on military regime took effect in August 2003.

149. The New Light of Myanmar newspaper is known as a mouthpiece of the military regime. The statement comes in reaction to U S new sanction. August 28, 2003.
150. See 2.4 of this paper. The literature reviews form Luc Reycher, p.216
151. See my review literature of this paper 2.3.3. Swedish Peace team Forum and European Center organized the conference at Gripsholm for Conflict Prevention. May 1-4, 2001.
152. European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation representatives organized the Working group 3, during the conference.
153. The participants are from European Union countries' Peace institutions and European Platform for Conflict Prevention.
154. EU sanctions on Burma in 1990 with Arms embargo, new measure added every year. ECU's new strategies April 2003 freeze on new bilateral economic aids to Burma. EU Common Position on Burma has been inconsistent with its action particularly 2001. .ALTSEAN-Burma Special Report , November 2003.
155. "The power mediator shares all the aims of the pure mediator, but the means are different: the power mediator has leverage over the conflicting parties. It uses incentive and punishments to persuade the parties to yield inflexible positions and to embrace the compromise." IDEA. 1998. P. 109
156. Sai Wansai: General Secretary, Shan Democratic Union. *Commentary: SPDC's National Convention Rhetoric and Power Mediation*. Asian Tribune 01/09/2003
157. *The UN Sanctions Regimes: The Case of Angola*, a specific case by Anders Mollander in "*Creative Forces in a Multidimensional World*" in the review literature. The UN Security Council directed against the Angola rebel UNITA's war efforts under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi, whom had resumed war after the election in 1992. The Security Council had reacted with unanimous decisions on sanctions in order to bring UNITA back to the democratic.
158. Robertson, Philip Jr. *Sanctions is working in Burma*. www.irrawaddy.org August 26 , 2003
159. Lars Rudebeck , *Democracy as Actual Practic* (2003), p. 8
160. Ibid.
161. Mary Anderson (1999), p. 24
162. Mary Anderson (1999), p. 23
163. ALTSEAN-Burma. Report. October 2002, which stated "The regime has impoverished civil institutions to subsidize a growing military complex that perpetrates massive, systematic abuse of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the people."
164. See Appendix A for International Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs) Main sector of activities: Health and HIV/AIDS got most of them.

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